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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of a switch from free to charged highway provision
on firm level outcomes for the period 2006-2016. To establish causality, this study
relies on a natural experiment which resulted from Portuguese authorities being forced
to introduce tolls on previously toll-free highways in the course of the sovereign debt
crisis. A difference-in-difference and event study specifications were used to estimate
this effect using firm-level data covering all business in the country. Estimations show
that this policy resulted in a 7,6% decrease of firms’ turnover. Furthermore, firms
in the secondary sector and large firms seem to have been affected more than others.
Both sales to the internal market and exports were significantly hit. Lastly, there was
also a significantly negative impact on number of employees, average wage and labor
productivity.
Keywords: SCUT, Natural experiment, Highway tolls, Difference-in-Difference
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1 Introduction
Transport infrastructure is key for economic development. Not only does it allow for circulation of
people, it is a fundamental piece in the exchange of goods. At the same time transport infrastructure
is rather expensive. Thus, it is essential to understand the relationship between transport infrastruc-
ture and economic outcomes in order to adequately design transport policy. Given the importance
of this topic, studies on the effect of transport infrastructure on aggregate economic outcomes are
quite abundant.2 However, micro level studies on the effect of transport infrastructure on firms
performance are rather limited. According to Holl (2016), the focus of researchers has traditionally
been on macro-economic analyses and only recently has their focus started to shift to micro-level
studies.3 This paper contributes to this still growing literature by studying the impact of an exoge-
nous increase in transport infrastructure on on a series of financial indicators of firm performance
using micro-level data.
It is not straightforward to estimate the causal effect of transport infrastructure on economic
outcomes as this kind of infrastructure is usually not assigned at random. This could lead to biased
results as it would not be clear if firms outcomes are varying due to a change in this kind of
infrastructure or other unobserved characteristics. A common solution in the literature for this
endogeneity problem is to use an Instrumental Variable (IV): planned routes IV, historical routes IV
or the inconsequential places approach (Redding and Turner, 2015). Although less common, some
papers alternatively use a natural experiment.4 This paper contributes to this growing literature by
using a recent natural experiment that occurred in Portugal.
2In an extensive survey made by Redding and Turner (2015) most studies focus on studying the impact of transport
infrastructure on: population growth (Baum-Snow (2007), Baum-Snow et al. (2017), Michaels, Rauch and Redding
(2012), García López, Holl and Viladecans Marsal (2013)), aggregate trade (Duranton, Morrow and Turner (2014),
Donaldson (2018)), GDP (Banerjee, Duflo and Qian (2012), Faber (2014)).
3Some studies that do explore the effect of transport infrastructure on micro-level outcomes, such as: firms’ exports
(Martincus, Carballo and Garcia (2012), Martincus and Blyde (2013), Martincus et al. (2014), Martincus, Carballo and
Cusolito (2017b), Martincus, Carballo and Cusolito (2017a)) and inventories (Datta (2012),Li and Li (2013),Shirley
and Winston (2004)), productivity (Lall, Shalizi and Deichmann (2004), Gibbons et al. (2016), Holl (2012), Holl
(2016), Martin-Barroso, Núñez-Serrano and Velázquez (2015), Graham (2007b), Graham (2007a)).
4For some examples of papers which also use a natural experiment as source of exogenous variation in infrastructure
see Martincus et al. (2014) and Martincus and Blyde (2013). Pereira, Pereira and Pereira dos Santos (2017) and
Audretsch, Pereira dos Santos and Dohse (2018) study the same natural experiment used in this paper but they use
municipal-level data.
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The SCUT highway system started being built in 1990 and came into completion in 2008 in
Portugal. Portuguese authorities made this network toll free for its users, hence the name SCUT
(“Sem Custo para o Utilizador” or “Without Cost for the User”). One of the main motivations
behind its conception was to create an alternative network to the old and deteriorated roads. This
new and more modern system sought to make traveling safer and lot faster. By the end of 2008,
SCUTs accounted for almost 1000km which was nearly a third of the Portuguese highway grid at
that time (Insituto Nacional de Estatística, INE).
However, following the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis in 2010, the Portuguese government
was forced to consolidate its financial position, cutting public spending and increasing public rev-
enues. Thus, it could no longer sustain the provision of a toll free network. The tolls were in-
troduced in two waves, first by the end of 2010 and, then, by the end of 2011. According to
the Financial Times, this led to angry protests, increases in business costs and confused tourists
(Financial Times, 2013).
This event provides an unique setting for a natural experiment, which allows one to study the
impact of an exogenous variation of transportation costs on firm related outcomes. This is only
possible because tolls were introduced purely out of the necessity to regulate government budget.
In other words, this decision was made without special consideration for the firms in those regions.5
Using a difference-in-difference and event study specification, this paper demonstrates that the
introduction of tolls had a strong impact on firms’ performance. This is evident in the results
that show a substantial decrease in firms’ turnover. Moreover, this analysis shows that large firms
and firms in the secondary sector were struck the hardest by this shock. Furthermore, exports
were significantly affected specially the ones to other EU countries. In addition, sales to to the
internal market suffered with the increase in transportation costs. Lastly, other firm-level outcomes,
such as, number of employees, average wage and labor productivity also experienced a significant
5Other studies use this natural experiment in their analyses to access the impact of this shock on other economic
outcomes. Pereira, Pereira and Pereira dos Santos (2017) show that the introduction of tolls resulted in the increase
of the number of accidents and road injuries. Moreover, another study by Audretsch, Pereira dos Santos and Dohse




The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review per-
taining to the topic at hand. Section 3 presents the data and methodology being used. Section 4
discusses the results and Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature Review
The core problem of trying to estimate the causal effect of transportation infrastructure on economic
outcomes is that transport infrastructure is not assigned at random. This creates an endogenity prob-
lem which impedes us from understanding whether variation in the outcome variables originates
from the variation in transportation infrastructure or other non observable factors related to the lo-
cation. The most recurrent strategy found in the literature to solve this problem is the use of an
instrumental variable. According to Redding and Turner (2015) the use of instrumental variables
in this literature can be categorized into three main strategies: planned route IV, historical route IV
and the inconsequential place approach.7
The planned route IV strategy consists on using planning maps as source of quasi-random
variation in observed infrastructure. In their study, Baum-Snow (2007) use the US 1947 interstate
highway network plan to determine whether the construction of access highways can account for
population decline in central cities. The validity of this approach relies on the the fact that the
plan was created for military purposes. Hence, the authors argue that these purposes and post war
commuters’ needs are orthogonal to each other. They found that one new highway passing through
central city results in population decreasing by 18%. The planned route IV approach has been
employed in other studies using highway projects in locations, such as, the US (Michaels, 2008;
Michaels, Rauch and Redding, 2012), 19th century Prussia (Hornung, 2015), Africa (Jedwab and
Moradi, 2016), Paris (Mayer and Trevien, 2017) and West Germany (Möller and Zierer, 2018).
6On a side note, it is worth mentioning that, in Portugal, the transportation of goods in mainly done through road
transports. According to Insituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), in 2010, 76% of goods were delivered via road
transportation.
7See Redding and Turner (2015) for a comprehensive survey on this literature
5
The historical route IV makes use of old transportation routes as a source of quasi-random vari-
ation in observed infrastructure. Duranton and Turner (2012) use maps of historical transportation
networks, such as, the 1898 map of US railroads, as well as, maps of major explorations of the
US for the period of 1535 to 1850 to estimate economic outcomes at the level of Metropolitan
Statistical Area. They argue that through this, they acquire a source of quasi-random variation in
the modern US interstate highway network. The validity of this strategy requires that the factors
which determine the composition of the US historical routes do not affect economic outcomes of
US cities between 1983 and 2003. In addition to this paper, Duranton and Turner wrote a series
of papers using the historical route IV strategy to estimate kilometers traveled by cars, changes in
metropolitan employment and trade flows between cities as function of the interstate highway grid
(Duranton and Turner, 2011; Duranton, Morrow and Turner, 2014). There are several examples
of studies where historical route IV is employed in other regions. Baum-Snow et al. (2017) resort
to old Chinese roads and urban rail networks from 1962 to study urban form in Chinese cities.
Another study by García López, Holl and Viladecans Marsal (2013) uses Spanish 18th century
postal routes and Roman roads to study the effect of highways on the sub-urbanization of Spanish
cities.(Hsu and Zhang, 2014) rely on historical railroad networks in Japan to study the elasticity of
traffic to road capacity. Finally, (Martincus, Carballo and Cusolito, 2017b) utilize the Inca roads
from Peru to study the impact of road infrastructure on exports and employment.
The inconsequential units approach basis itself on the fact that infrastructure connecting big
cities traverses economically small units, lying between them, only at random. Following this
reasoning, the unobserved characteristics of units lying between large cities are inconsequential
to the decision of the route (Redding and Turner, 2015, p.21). Chandra and Thompson were the
pioneers of this strategy with their study on the effect of access to the US interstate highways system
in rural counties (Chandra and Thompson, 2000). They deliberately chose rural counties with the
intent of selecting regions which received interstate highways “accidentally”. In other words, they
have access to this network only because they are situated between large cities. Another example of
this approach is the study by Banerjee, Duflo and Qian (2012) where an hypothetical transportation
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network is created linking historical treaty ports to large interior trading centers. Just like in the
previous example, they argue that counties next to these predicted network are there “accidentally”.
Other studies employing inconsequential units approach have been performed by Datta (2012),
Faber (2014), Ghani, Goswami and Kerr (2016) and Fretz, Parchet and Robert-Nicoud (2017).
The strategies described above have become the standard approach in the recent literature.
However, it’s important to note that these identification strategies have their own shortcomings.
In fact, according to Redding and Turner (2015), their plausibility depends on the details of their
implementation and is sometimes debatable. In the case of planned routes, one should be cautious
when using them as sources of quasi-random variation in infrastructure. If a country’s strategy
on infrastructure decision is consistent across time, then it is unreasonable to assume that choos-
ing to implement only a part of the planned route and not the other is done at random(Audretsch,
Pereira dos Santos and Dohse, 2018). Therefore, in some cases similar to this one, locations crossed
by planned routes, which never came to completion, are an inappropriate comparison group for the
ones where the infrastructure was actually constructed. Even though, the inconsequential units ap-
proach does not face this problem, its external validity is quite limited since it can only be applied
to certain regions. In other words, since this approach only looks at economically small locations,
one cannot use it to estimate the effect of infrastructure in economically larger cities. An alternative
to the approaches that were mentioned so far is natural experiments. Although they’re less com-
mon in this field - presumably because they’re not easily extended to other applications - they are
a plausible source of quasi-random variation. This paper, will focus on such a natural experiment,
namely, the introduction of highway tolls on the formerly toll-free SCUT highways in Portugal.
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3 Data and Empirical Approach
3.1 Data
For the purpose of this study, both municipal- and firm-level data was used. The firm-level infor-
mation was gathered from the Central Balance Sheet database provided by Banco de Portugal.8 It
consists of economic and financial information on Portuguese firms (such as financial balance sheet
indicators, location, number of employees, size, among others). This is quite an extensive dataset
comprising 554,133 firms during the period of 2006-2016, amounting to a total of 3,677,473 ob-
servations.9 Note that it is an unbalanced dataset as not all firms have observations for all the years
in this period. Additionally, only firms in Portugal mainland were considered, hence firms from
Madeira and Azores are not part of the analysis.
From here, the following firm-level variables were gathered: turnover, number of workers,
average wage, labor productivity, exports and sales (discriminated by geographical destiny), and
inventories.10Note that the variables for turnover, number of workers, exports and sales, average
wage, labor productivity and inventories were logarithmized with the intention of bringing skewed
data closer to a normal distribution. To prevent the loss of observations equal to zero and thus
avoiding biased estimates, an extra value of one was added (e.g. Log(Turnover+ 1)) when using
the log transformation on these variables.
Additionally, this dataset was used to create the variables Exit and Moved. Exit is a binary
variable that takes the value 1 when a firms suspends or ceases activity and 0 otherwise.11 The
8The data in this database is collected through Simplified Business Information (IES - Informação Estatística Sim-
plificada) since 2006. IES is an annual report that must be filled online by firms. This report is mandatory and non-
compliants are penalized. The quality of this data is then monitored by Statistics Portugal who check with respondents
on a regular basis.
9This corresponds to the total number of observations after dropping firms with no municipality reported, non
positive levels of turnover and non positive number of employees. This last drop is meant to eliminate cases of self-
employment from the sample.
10Average wage and labor productivity were computed by the author. Average wage was calculated as the ratio
between total salaries of employees and number of employees. Labor productivity was computed as the ratio between
turnover and number of employees.
11The variable Exit was created based on information on firm status provided by Banco de Portugal. Note that this
information was subject to quality control using complementary sources to the data gathered from Simplified Business
Information (IES - Informação Estatística Simplificada).
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variable Moved is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a firm changes municipality and 0 other-
wise. These variables are later used to analyse the impact of the introduction of tolls on these firm
level outcomes and the probabilities of firms changing municipality or exiting the market.12
This data was supplemented with municipal information which allows to control for time-
variant municipal-level covariates. Municipal socio-demographic characteristics were gathered
from Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE). Informationon per capita electricity consumption was
retrieved from Direção Geral de Energia e Geologia (DGEG) and data on municipal expenditures
was acquired from Direção Geral das Autarquias Locais (DGAL). With this data, the variables age
dependency ratio, population density, electricity consumption per capita and municipal expendi-
tures per capita were created and later added to the model to control for municipal time varying
characteristics (which will be later discussed in the next section).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the dependent variables and the controls variables used
in the study.13
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The validity of this model relies on the fact that the introduction of tolls on SCUT highways was
forced by an exogenous shock (the sovereign debt crisis) upon the Portuguese political authorities.
Being a national matter, municipal authorities played no role in this decision nor were they able
to directly intervene.14At the same time, there was no discrimination nor favoritism towards these
municipalities.15
The treatment under study is the introduction of tolls in the SCUT highways. As such, mu-
nicipalities are divided into a treatment group and a control group. All municipalities that have a
segment of the SCUT highway network belong to the treatment group. These amounts to 59 mu-
12Ideally, this study would also include a binary variable Enter that takes the value 1 when a firm enters the market
and 0 otherwise. However due to data restrictions, it was not possible to include such a variable.
13Additionally, for a more indepth description of each variable see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
14Even though, there were huge protests made by SCUT highway users and local mayors, they had no saying in
this decision. (See https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/transportes/detalhe/municipios_e_
utentes_perdem_accoes_contra_portagens)
15Audretsch, Pereira dos Santos and Dohse (2018) show that there was no political attempt to favor municipalities
of the same political party.
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nicipalities in the treatment group and 219 in the comparison group.16 Note that the municipalities
in the control group do have other non-SCUT highways. However, it is important to point out that
these other highways were already subject to charges a long time before this crisis and that these
charges were not affected by the shock (the crisis). As far as the treatment period goes, note that in
some treated municipalities, tolls were introduced on the 15th of October 2010 and in others, this
happened on the 8th of December 2011.
The effect of an increase in transportation costs on the outcome yit was estimated using the
following difference-in-difference specification for firm f in municipality i and year t, during the
period 2006-2016:
y f it = β0 +αi +λt + γTreatedi×PostPeriodit +X
′
itβ1 + ε f it (1)
where y f it is the firm-level outcome variables of interest, turnover, αi denotes municipality
fixed effects, λt represents year fixed effects and X
′
it is a vector of economic and socio-demographic
municipal level controls. Additionally other outcomes, such as, probability of exiting the market,
probability of switching municipalities, firms’ exports and sales, number of employees, average
wage and labor productivity will also be analyzed.
The vector X
′
it was added to control for time-varying municipal characteristics. This helps
mitigate by design possible bias that might be caused by omitted variables. To control for socio-
demographic characteristics, the variables age dependency ratio and population density are ac-
counted for in the model. Additionally, the model includes electricity consumption per capita and
municipal expenses per capita to control for municipal income.
The variable of interest is Treated×PostPeriod which represents the interaction between the
Treated dummy and the PostPeriod treatment dummy. The Treated variable takes the value 1
for municipalities in the treatment group and 0 otherwise, whilst the variable PostPeriod equals
1 from the year the treatment starts onward. Note that for firms in municipalities where the tolls
were introduced on the 15th of October 2010, PostPeriod dummy equals 1 from 2011 onward. As
16In Table A.2, there’s a list with the municipalities which were affected by this shock and in Figure A.1, there’s a
geographical display of these municipalities.
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for the firms in municipalities where the tolls were introduced on the 8th of December 2011, the
PostPeriod dummy equals 1 from 2012 onward. When looking at the results in a later section, the
coefficient of interest will be γ as it gives us the treatment effect.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level municipality to correct for het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation since treatment varies at this level (Bertrand, Duflo and Mul-
lainathan, 2004). However, some firms change municipality during the period under study. There-
fore, the municipality at the time of the treatment was used to cluster the standard errors i.e. the
location of the firm in the year 2009 just before the treatment. Additionally, for firms that do not
have an observation for this year (since this is an unbalanced panel), the location of the firm at the
time it first appears in the sample was used.
4 Result Analysis
4.1 Testing for Internal Validity
The internal validity of a Difference-in-Difference estimation model relies on the parallel trends as-
sumption being satisfied. This assumption states that in absence of treatment, the average outcome
of the treatment group would have changed in same way as the average outcome of the control
group. A common technique used to test this is to compare the evolution of the outcomes variable
in the treated and control group during the per-treatment period (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Fig-
ure 1 displays the mean evolution of the main dependent variable, the logarithm of turnover. This
graphical representation does not show proof of distinct per-treatment trends between treatment and
control groups capable of compromising the empirical strategy. As such, this inspection supports
the validity of the model. For a more rigorous test on the validity of the parallel trends assumption
an event study is conducted below.
An event study has two main advantages. On the one hand, it allows us to observe whether the
strength of the treatment varies with time. On the other hand, it provides a more rigorous test of
the common trend assumption then the plot previously made. The estimating equation for the event
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study is:










itβ1 + ε f it (2)
Notice that in equation 2 the interaction terms for all pre- and post-treatment years are included
except for 2009. This way, all the coefficients are estimated relative to the year 2009 which is
the last year before the treatment started. Figure 2 shows the event study for the main dependent
variable, the logarithm of turnover.17
For all the pre-treatment years, the interaction terms are small and not significantly different
from zero. This shows strong proof in favor of the validity of the common trend assumption and
confirms the results from visual plot previously analyzed. Furthermore, notice from 2014 on the
coefficient becomes significantly negative. This already suggests that the introduction of tolls has
introduced a statistically significant difference between treated regions and the comparison group.
Additionally, it further implies that this effect may have not been immediate (as the coefficient only
becomes significant in 2014).18
Lastly, a balance test was computed on Table 2. This allows one to compare mean differences
between treatment and control group in the pre-treatment period (2006-2009) Looking at the results,
there seems to be no statistical significant difference for the variables Electricity Consumption pc and
Expenses pc. As for the other two variables, although the difference is statistical significant, it is
also very small.
17If any other shocks other than the treatment occur during the time period under analysis, it’s important that they
affect the treatment and control group similarly (Tavares and Pereira dos Santos, 2018). In this study, the time period
includes one of the greatest recessions in history, the world’s financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis
that directly hit Portugal, forcing the country to request an international bailout. Given that this crisis might have
affected municipalities differently, a NUTS2*year dummy is used in the model’s specification to mitigate this problem.
Moreover, Tavares and Pereira dos Santos (2018) show that the allocation of European funds is important for business
firms dynamics. Since this allocation is done at the NUTS2-level, using a NUTS2*year dummy can help accounting
for this effect.
18Table A.3 presents the results of the Event Study in more detail.
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4.2 Baseline Specification
After estimating Equation 1 one obtains the following results as shown in Table 3 for the main
dependent variable, turnover. In this table, all columns include firm, year and municipality fixed
effects. Column (1), (2) and (3) add regional year fixed effects: NUTS2*year, district*year and
NUTS3*year fixed effects, respectively.19 Notice that the Column with NUTS2*year is the least
demanding specification from these three columns, whilst the one with NUTS3*year is the most
demanding one. This is due to the fact that by including NUTS3*year, 21 dummies are being added
to the model. On the other hand, with NUTS2*year and district*year less dummies are included
in the specification (5 and 18 respectively).20 Columns (4), (5) and (6) add sector fixed effects to
these first three columns. Lastly, Column (7) adds a set of municipal controls variables (described
in the previous chapter) to the first column specification. For all specifications, Table 3 shows the
treatment effect (γ) of the introduction of tolls on firms’ turnover, here represented by the term
Treated×PostPeriod.
Looking at the estimates for the treatment effect (γ) in table 3, notice they’re all negative and
statistically significant at a 1% level in Columns (2), (3), (5), (6) and at the 10% level in Columns
(1), (4), (7). When controlling for regional NUTS2 year fixed effects one obtains a result of
−7,6% which does not vary by much when adding sector fixed effects or municipal level controls.
This means that firms located in treated municipalities experienced an average decrease of −7,6%
turnover vis à vis firms located in comparison regions. If instead, one uses regional NUTS3 or dis-
trict year fixed effects, the estimates decrease to −11,5% and −10% respectively. The estimated
coefficient is relatively stable. However, notice that when using a more demanding specification,
this coefficient becomes slightly larger.
These findings suggest a sizable effect of the introduction of tolls on firms’ turnover and thus
on firms’ performance. Take for instance Column (1). According to this result, firms’ turnover in
the treatment group decreased by 7,6% after the tolls were introduced in SCUT highways.
19See the maps in Appendix A.2 for more details on how each of these classifications divides the Portuguese territory.
20Municipalities were grouped into 18 districts, based on the district system that dates back to 1835. Districts have
been removed from the legal framework, however they are still used to this day for statistical purposes.
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4.3 Robustness and Heterogeneity
4.3.1 Robustness
As to further ensure the robustness of the model, a set of exercises was computed in Table 4. The
Columns in this table follow same specification as Columns (1) and (7) of the previous Table 3,
but this time the sample is restricted. In Columns (1) and (2), district capitals are excluded from
the sample. In Columns (3) and (4), all municipalities along the Atlantic are eliminated from the
sample. Lastly, in Columns (5) and (6) only single establishment firms are accounted for.
District capitals are the main regional markets for consumer goods and services. This means
that producers, which are not located in these regions, need to transport their goods all the way to
these markets to be able to reach their costumers. Following this logic, one may hypothesize that
producers who are more distant from these district capitals, are also more prone to be affected by
higher transportation costs when trying to get their products to their costumers. Thus, if firms in
district capitals are excluded from the sample, one may expect a significantly higher effect of the
introduction of tolls on the other firms, which depend more on highways as a mean of transportation
for their products. Looking at the results in table 4, the estimated coefficients are in line with
this hypothesis. As expected, by excluding district capitals, the size of the coefficient becomes
significantly bigger. This indicates that firms situated outside district capitals were more affected
by the tolls.
The next exercise is to drop all municipalities along the coast from the sample. The estimated
coefficients in Table 4 shows that the results are consistent with the baseline specification.
Lastly, for the final exercise only single establishments are considered. Some of the firms in
the sample have more than one establishment, although they only represent 3,08% of the total
sample. However, this exercise was important to make sure the results are consistent if only single
establishment firms had been included in the study from the beginning. As shown in Table 4, results
are consistent with the baseline specification.
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4.3.2 Placebo Test
Additionally, a placebo exercise is built to simulate the difference-in-difference analysis for a point
in time where the treatment had not been implemented yet. In order to do this, let us consider the
pre-treatment period, 2006-2009, and split it into two: either divide it in the middle, 2006-2007
and 2008-2009, or divide it into 2006-2008 and 2009. Table 5 presents the results of the placebo
regression. The first two columns show the results of the placebo regression if the pre-treatment
period is split in the middle whereas the last two columns show the alternative split. Looking at the
results, all interaction terms are statistically not significant. Hence, these findings, together with
the previous testes made, provide reinforced evidence that the results obtained previously for the
log of turnover are indeed caused by the introduction of tolls rather than some other unobserved
factors of the SCUT regions.
4.3.3 Heterogeneity
To run a deeper analysis on the effect of the introduction of the tolls on firms’ turnover, Table 6 de-
scriminates firms by size and sector. Firm size is defined according to Eurostat classification: small
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) have 1-249 workers whereas large enterprises have 250 or
more workers. Additionally, firms were sorted by sector following INE’s (Instituto Nacional de Es-
tatistica) recommendation.21 Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. The results on Table 6 show
that large firms were more affected than small and medium size enterprises. This is consistent with
the idea that larger firms have a higher tendency to export their products to other countries or other
municipalities within Portugal. As such, they’re more susceptible to an increase in transportation
costs.
Furthermore, the secondary sector seems to have been struck the hardest by the introduction
of tolls when compared to the service sector. A plausible explanation for this result is that man-
ufacturing firms tend to export their products more or in the least they’re not necessarily near the
21Primary Sector was not included in the analysis as it had very few observations. Furthermore, construction was
analyzed seperately from the secondary sector. For more details on how each firm was categorized to each sector see
Table A.4 in the Appendix.
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markets they serve. Whereas firms in the service sector tend to be closer to their market, thus they
are less affected by an increase in transportation cost than the manufacturing sector.
4.4 Probability of Exiting and Probability of Moving
So far in the analysis, we’ve been looking at the effect of the introduction of tolls on firms’ turnover.
But another interesting question is whether this increase in transportation costs lead firms to move
to another municipality or even exit the market. To try to answer this question, a set of regressions
were computed shown in Table 7. Note that all regression on this table follow a Linear Probability
Model (LPM). Similarly to Table 3 Column (1), (2) and (3) use regional year fixed effects: NUTS2,
NUTS3 and district year fixed effects respectively. Columns (4), (5) and (6) add sector fixed effects
to these specifications. Column (7) adds a set of municipal level controls. All specifications include
municipal and year fixed effects. However, note that this time around, firm fixed effects were not
included. This is due to the nature of the variables, which by definition have a very low variability.
That is, their values vary utmost once from 0 to 1 when a firm changes municipality or exits the
market. As such, these variables have very low individual within variation. Therefore, adding firm
fixed effects might not be appropriate.22
Examining the results obtained for the probability of firms changing municipality, Table 7
shows that all estimated coefficients are statistically not significant. Furthermore, in regards to
the probability of exiting, Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) show statistically significant results. How-
ever, the size of these coefficients is very small. Therefore, there is no evidence that the introduction
of tolls lead to firms changing municipality or exiting the market.
4.5 Other Outcomes
To have a better understanding of how firms were affected by the the unexpected increase in trans-
portation costs, it is important to look at other firm-level outcomes. Tables 8 and 9 show the
estimated effect of this shock on the following outcomes: exports (to the EU and the rest of the
22The author did however try to do the same exercise including firm fixed effects and similar results were obtained.
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world), number of employees, labor productivity, average wage and inventories.
Looking at Columns (1) - (6) from Table 8, it seems that this treatment had a substantial effect
on firms exports. In fact, firms subject to this shock saw their exports decrease by 5% at a 10%
confidence level. Going one step further, Columns (3) - (6) separately analyze the exports that were
destined to the EU market from the ones going to the rest of the world. One can see that, exports to
the EU area were significantly affected whilst no significant effect was found for the ones directed
to the non-EU market. More precisely, exports to the EU decreased by around 6% for firms in
treated areas. Note that this decrease in exports coincides with the hypothesis previously made
in regards to how the manufacturing sector, as well as, large firms were affected by the shock. If
indeed, these two type of firms tend to export more, then it’s only natural that these firms were
more vulnerable to this shock, given that exports were heavily affected.
But sales to the outside market were not the only ones that were struck by this shock. According
to the findings in Columns (7) - (8), the sales to the internal market suffered a significant decrease
due to this policy. Treated regions saw their sales to this market decrease by 7% vis à vis comparison
regions.
The results obtained for the sales to the EU and the internal market can be explained by the
dependence of these two markets on road transportation. In regards to the EU market, note that
Spain is one of the main trading partner of Portugal.23 Spain’s proximity to Portugal makes trade
between these two countries more reliable on road transportation. In addition, Spain’s relevance
for Portuguese exports, makes Portuguese firms’ more vulnerable to an increase in transportation
costs to this market. This could possibly explain the decrease in exports to the EU market. As
for the internal market, firm’s which relied on the SCUT highways to transport their products to
other municipalities, saw their sales decrease due to this increase in transportation costs. In sum,
a plausible explanation for these results is that this policy mainly affected producers which rely on
these roads to bring their products to other parts of the country (internal market) and to other EU
countries (specially Spain).
23According toBanco de Portugal, in 2010, Portugal’s exports to Spain accounted for 32% of the total exports made
to the EU area.
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Based on the results obtained in Table 9, the introduction of tolls had a significantly negative
effect on the number of workers. At a 10% significance level, the number of employees of treated
firms decreased by 1%. These results are consistent with the findings of Audretsch, Pereira dos San-
tos and Dohse (2018), who found a significantly negative impact on employment at the municipal-
level. Although the point estimate on the impact of the introduction of tolls on average wages is
negative, no claims can be made in regards to the impact of the treatment on this variable as its
coefficient is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
In Column (9), the coefficient for labor productivity is not statistically significant. However,
once one controls for time-varying municipal level characteristics, it becomes statistically signifi-
cant at a 10% significant level. Under this specification it shows that the treatment decreased labor
productivity by 3,8% for firms in the treated regions. As for the last two Columns, no evidence was
found on the effect of the introduction of tolls on firms’ inventories. This result may be attributed
to large number of small and medium firms in the sample. A plausible explanation is that these
type of firms may be less efficient in managing their inventories. This lack of efficiency may result
in delayed adjustments to achieve optimal inventory stocking.24
5 Conclusion
Few studies make use of a natural experiment as a source of exogenous variation in transport in-
frastructure. This paper follows this approach by exploiting the introduction of tolls on Portuguese
SCUT highways which was forced upon Portuguese authorities.
Results suggest that the introduction of tolls had a substantial impact on firms’ performance
in regions that previously had toll-free SCUT highways. As shown, this increase in transportation
costs had a significant negative impact on firms’ turnover. Furthermore, the firms in the secondary
sector alongside large firms seem to have been struck the hardest by this shock. Exports also
suffered a sizable decrease, specially the ones targeted to other EU countries. Moreover, sales to
the internal market were also heavily affected by this policy. Lastly, the introduction of tolls lead
24In this sample, 80% of firms are SMEs (Small and Medium sized Enterprises).
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to a decrease in the number of employees, average wage and labor productivity.
In sum, introducing tolls and increasing transportation costs for firms in these areas had a detri-
mental effect on firms’ performance. This is shown by the sizable decrease in firms’ turnover.
Moreover, sales to more road dependent locations were struck the hardest. This might explain the
significant decrease in exports to the EU partner countries, as well as, the decrease in sales to the
internal market. In face of higher transportation costs, producers struggled to deliver their products
to these destinations. In line with this hypothesis, firms in the secondary sector, as well as, large
firms were more affected by this policy. These type of firms have a higher tendency to export to
other countries and, at the same time, to other municipalities in Portugal. Therefore, they’re more
vulnerable to an increase in transportation costs to these markets.
In conclusion, even though this policy helped to achieve budgetary goals momentously, it also
translated into substantial costs for Portuguese firms. It is possible that policy makers started real-




Figure 1: Evolution of Log of Turnover
Coefficients for Log of Turnover
Notes: This graph was computed using year fixed effects, municipal fixed effects and a NUTS2*year dummy. The
90% confidence levels are calculated using clustered standard errors at the municipal level. Results using the set of
time-varying controls are very similar and are available upon request. These municipal time-varying controls include
electricity consumption per capita, age dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita.
Figure 2: Event Study
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7 Tables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Main Dependent Variable
Log of Turnover 3.677.473 10,21193 4,116228 0 22,98802
Probabilities
Exit 3.677.473 0,0319344 0,1758256 0 1
Moved 3.677.473 0,0182024 0,1336829 0 1
Other Outcomes
Log Number of Workers 3.677.473 1,262944 0,9832968 0 10,11387
Log of Exports 3.677.473 1,503811 3,817034 0 22,02988
Log of Exports - EU Market 3.677.473 1,225637 3,462759 0 21,3901
Log of Exports - Extra EU Market 3.677.473 0,6440802 2,570737 0 21,44868
Log of Sales - Internal Market 3.677.473 9,984998 4,236277 -0,0512933 22,58125
Log of Average Wage 3.043.943 6,537879 3,78099 0 14,63995
Log of Labor Productivity 3.043.943 10,11218 2,404479 0 20,96442
Log of Inventories and Biological Assets 3.677.473 5,774278 5,374746 -1,203973 20,94546
Control Variables
Electricity Consumption pc 3.677.473 4,881396 3,421607 1,526943 83,85919
Population Density 3.677.473 1718,366 2132,229 4,2 7492,4
Age Dependency Ratio 3.677.473 0,5338962 0,0952578 0,371478 1,107895
Expenses pc 3.677.473 0,5072029 0,2351439 0,0891436 2,639032
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Treatment Group Control Group Difference Std. Errors
Electricity Consumption pc 5,241 4,878 0,363 (0,514)
Population Density 799,078 2054,233 -0,0013* (686,653)
Age Dependency Ratio 0,474 0,522 -0,048** (0,019)
Expenses pc 0,463 0,495 -0,032 (0,070)
Notes: Results on this table are based on the pre-treatment period 2006-2009. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipal level. “pc” stand for “per capita”. Stars indicate significance
levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***).
Table 2: Balance Test
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of Turnover
Treated×PostPeriod −0,0760∗ −0,100∗∗∗ −0,115∗∗∗ −0,0761∗ −0,101∗∗∗ −0,115∗∗∗ −0,0750∗
(0,0407) (0,0286) (0,0316) (0,0406) (0,0286) (0,0315) (0,0404)
R-squared 0,038 0,038 0,038 0,038 0,038 0,038 0,038
Firm FE       
Municipality FE       
Year FE       
Nuts 2 × Year FE   
District ×Year FE  
Nuts 3 ×Year FE  
Sector FE   
Controls 
Notes: N=3.677.473. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector of socio-
-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age dependency ratio,
population density and expenses per capita. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
Table 3: Baseline Results
Exclude District Capitals Exclude Coast Single Estab. Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of Turnover
Treated×PostPeriod −0,126∗∗∗ −0,109∗∗∗ −0,0736∗ −0,0731∗ −0.0758∗ −0.0750∗
(0,0462) (0,0420) (0,0422) (0,0393) (0.0421) (0.0417)
R-squared 0,041 0,041 0,038 0,038 0,038 0,038
N 2.589.616 2.589.616 1.913.944 1.913.944 3.564.083 3.564.083
Firm FE      
Municipality FE      
Year FE      
Nuts 2 × Year FE      
Controls   
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector of socio-demographic
and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age dependency ratio, population
density and expenses per capita. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
Table 4: Robustness Tests
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2008 placebo Shock 2009 placebo Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Turnover
Treated×PostPeriod −0,0187 −0,0189 −0,0255 −0,0221
(0,0201) (0,0207) (0,0230) (0,0224)
R-squared 0,008 0,008 0,008 0,008
Firm FE    
Municipality FE    
Year FE    
Nuts 2 × Year FE    
Controls  
Notes: N=1.241.388. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the
municipal level. The vector of socio-demographic and economic controls
includes electricity consumption per capita, age dependency ratio, population
density and expenses per capita. Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*),
5% (**), and 1%(***).
Table 5: Placebo Test
SMEs Large Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of Turnover
Treated×PostPeriod −0,0498∗ −0,0505∗ −0,0658∗ −0,0667∗ −0,105∗∗ −0,0999∗∗ −0,0736∗ −0,0732∗
(0,0290) (0,0259) (0,0381) (0,0346) (0,0531) (0,0498) (0,0383) (0,0380)
R-squared 0,015 0,015 0,035 0,037 0,046 0,046 0,036 0,036
N 3.035.671 3.035.671 8.272 8.272 438.631 438.631 2.681.294 2.681.294
Firm-FE        
Municipality FE        
Year FE        
Nuts 2 × Year FE        
Controls    
Notes: N=1.241.388. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector of socio-demographic and
economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita.
Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
Table 6: Heterogeneity Results
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prob. of Changing Mun.
Treated×PostPeriod 0,00083 0,0017 0,0014 0,00083 0,0017 0,0014 0,00076
(0,0027) (0,0041) (0,0039) (0,0027) (0,0041) (0,0039) (0,0029)
R-squared 0,004 0,005 0,005 0,004 0,005 0,005 0,004
Prob. of Exiting
Treated×PostPeriod 0,0019 0,0018∗ 0,0018∗ 0,0019 0,0018∗ 0,0018∗ 0,0017
(0,0013) (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0013) (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0012)
R-squared 0,003 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,003
Municipality FE       
Year FE       
Nuts 2 × Year FE   
Nuts 3 ×Year FE  
District ×Year FE  
Sector FE   
Controls 
Notes: N=3.677.473. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector
of socio-demographic and economic controls includes electricity consumption per capita, age
dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Stars indicate significance levels
of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***). Results shown above are calculated using a Linear Probability
Model (LPM). The author tried to do the same exercise including irm fixed effects and similar results
were obtained.
Table 7: Regression results for probability of exiting and probability of moving
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Exports Log Exp. (EU Market) Log Exp. (Extra EU Market) Sales (Internal Market)
Treated×PostPeriod −0,0479∗ −0,0500∗ −0,0627∗∗ −0,0643∗∗ 0,0223 0,0205 −0,0738∗ −0,0721∗
(0,0288) (0,0276) (0,0281) (0,0256) (0,0172) (0,0175) (0,0418) (0,0406)
R-squared 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,003 0,005 0,005 0,036 0,036
N 3.677.473 3.677.473 3.677.473 3.677.473 3.677.473 3.677.473 3.677.495 3.677.495
Firm FE        
Municipality FE        
Year FE        
Nuts 2 × Year FE        
Controls    
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector of socio-demographic and economic controls includes
electricity consumption per capita, age dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Stars indicate significance levels of
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***).
Table 8: Regression results for firm-level exports
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Log Numb. Workers Log Labor Productivity Log Average Wage Log Inventories
Treated×PostPeriod −0,0101∗ −0,0102∗ -0,0377 −0,0379∗ -0,0250 -0,0260 -0,0063 -0,0035
(0,00569) (0,00548) (0,0247) (0,0220) (0,0172) (0,0171) (0,0287) (0,0271)
R-squared 0,023 0,023 0,011 0,012 0,005 0,005 0,025 0,025
N 3.677.473 3.677.473 3.043.943 3.043.943 3.043.943 3.043.943 3.677.473 3.677.473
Firm FE        
Municipality FE        
Year FE        
Nuts 2 × Year FE        
Controls    
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the municipal level. The vector of socio-demographic and economic controls
includes electricity consumption per capita, age dependency ratio, population density and expenses per capita. Stars indicate
significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***).
Table 9: Regression results for other firm-level outcomes
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Turnover Total number of sales and services of a given firm BdP
Treatment Variables
Treated Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a given municipality ANSR
is crossed by a SCUT highway and 0 otherwise.
(See Table A.2)
PostPeriod Binary variable that takes the value 1 for all periods after the
treatment started and 0 otherwise. (See Table A.2)
Probabilities
Exit Binary variable that takes the value 1 when a firms suspends BdP
or ceases activity and 0 otherwise.
Moved Binary variable that equals 1 when a firm changes municipality BdP
and 0 otherwise.
Other Outcomes
Number of Workers Total number of (paid and unpaid) employees in a given firm. BdP
Exports Total sales and services of a given firm to the outside market. BdP
Exports - EU Market Total sales and services of a given firm to the EU-Market. BdP
Exports - Extra EU Market Total sales and service of a given firm to the rest of the world. BdP
Average Wage Ratio between total salary of employees and the number of BdP
employees.
Labor Productivity Ratio between turnover and number of employees. BdP
Inventories and Biological Assets Raw and subsidiary materials and consumables; Advances BdP
from customers; Inventories (excepting Raw and subsidiary
materials and consumables).
Municipal Control Variables
Electricity Consumption pc Total consumption of electricity in a given municipality divided DGEG
by the number of inhabitantsof that municipality (Unit: Thousand
of kWh/Inhabitants).
Population Density Number of inhabitants in a given municipality divided by the INE
respective municipality area (Unit: Inhabitants/km2).
Age Dependency Ratio Ratio of individuals usually not part of the labor force (age 0-14 INE
and +65) and individuals part of the active population (age 15-64)
(Unit: Percentage).
Expenses pc Total municipal expenses divided by the number of inhabitants DGAA
of the respective municipality (Unit: Thousand of Euros/Inhabitants).
Notes: “pc” stands for “per capita”; ANSR (Autoridade Nacional de Segurança Rodoviária);
DGEG (Direção Geral de Energia e Geologia); BdP (Banco de Portugal - Central Balance Sheet);
INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística); DGAL (Direção Geral das Autarquias Locais).
Table A.1: Variable Description
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SCUT Highway Municipalities Affected
Tolls introduced on the 15th October 2010
SCUT Grande Porto - 79 Km
A4: AE Transmontana Matosinhos, Maia.
A41: CREP - Circular Regional Exterior do Porto Matosinhos, Valongo, Santa Maria da Feira, Espinho.
A42: AE Douro Litoral Valongo, Paços de Ferreira, Paredes, Lousada.
SCUT Litoral Norte -113 Km
A28 Matosinhos, Vila do Conde, Póvoa de Varzim,
Esposende, Viana do Castelo, Caminha.
SCUT Costa da Prata – 110 Km
A29 Estarreja, Ovar, Espinho, Vila Nova de Gaia.
Tolls introduced on the 8th December 2011
SCUT Algarve – 133 Km
A22 Lagos, Monchique, Portimão, Lagoa, Silves, Albufeira,
Loulé, Faro, Olhão, Tavira, Castro Marim, Vila Real
de Sto.António.
SCUT Beira Interior – 217 Km
A23 Torres Novas, Entroncamento, Constância, Abrantes,
Mação, Gavião, Vila Velha de Rodão,Vila Nova da
Barquinha,Castelo Branco, Fundão, Belmonte, Covilhã,
Guarda.
SCUT Interior Norte – 162 Km
A24 Viseu, Castro Daire, Lamego, Peso da Régua, Vila Real,
Vila Pouca de Aguiar, Chaves.
SCUT Beiras Litoral e Alta – 173 Km
A25 Ílhavo, Aveiro, Albergaria-a-Velha, Sever do Vouga,
Oliveira de Frades, Vouzela, Viseu,Mangualde, Fornos
de Algodres, Celorico da Beira, Guarda, Pinhel, Almeida.
Table A.2: Municipalities Affected by the Introduction of Tolls in the SCUT Highways
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Note: Darkened regions represent treated municipalities whereas light regions depict municipalities in the control
group. Graph retrieved from Marktest.
Figure A.1: Geographical Distribution of Affected Municipalities
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Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.
Stars indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%(***)
Table A.3: Event Study Results
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Note: Graphs retrieved from Marktest.
Figure A.2: Dividing Portugal into regions
Firm sector definition according to Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE)
Note: In the database provided by Banco de Portugal, firms’ economic acivity was classified according to CAE Rev.3.
This table provided by INE shows the corresponding sector to each firm’s economic activity classification.
Table A.4: Definition of Size and Sector
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